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Introduction
In place of the distinct peoples and cultures that once formed the object of ethnographic inquiry, anthropologists have for some time been emphasizing the political and economic processes which connect people and places, and the ongoing production of cultural difference in contexts of unequal power. This trend in scholarly analysis contrasts with 1 assumptions about primordial difference which inspire indigenous rights activists to defend the autonomy of culturally distinct communities from state and market processes intruding on them from the outside. It contrasts also with the emphasis on difference and isolation in official 2 discourses that cast "development" as a program to bring change to people without history, stalled at an earlier point of an evolutionary process.
In Indonesia it is the interior of the larger islands, and the smaller islands of the eastern part of the archipelago, that are usually characterized as culturally distinct frontiers incompletely inscribed by civilization, world religions, and the power of governing regimes. These regions are currently the focus of bitter struggles which pit promoters of state-directed "development" (in the form of mining, logging, export-oriented agriculture, transmigration) against rural people and their supporters who emphasize the attendant ecological devastation and the loss of resource rights, livelihoods and traditional management practices. Locked in their own confrontation, both sides tend to overlook long histories of connection between the interior (upland or upriver, according to the topography) and the systems of trade and government emanating from, or channeled through, the coast. Yet these relations have had deeply formative effects on interior domains, shaping peoples' responses to contemporary development agendas.
My goal in this article is to expose the economic and political relations that have linked coast and hills in different periods, and consider how cultural difference is produced and deployed in these exchanges. In other work, I have reviewed the literature on Indonesia's upland regions, and explored government and non-government interventions from a comparative perspective Li (1999a; 1999b; 2000) . Here I seek to deepen these discussions through a detailed examination of a particular place, the Tinombo-Tomini district of Central Sulawesi. I base my study on published sources, and my ethnographic research in the area totaling nine months over the period 1990-1998. The area is home to about thirty thousand Lauje, roughly divided between the hills and the narrow coastal strip. The spatial configuration is unusually compressed, since the hills rise steeply only a kilometer or two from the sea. There are no navigable rivers or plateaux and the valleys are narrow. Most coastal dwellers have never set foot in the hills, which are accessible only by steep, winding, unmarked foot trails. The land is nevertheless fairly densely settled and swidden farming extends almost to the center of the peninsula, about thirty kilometers as the crow flies. A social boundary separates the people of hills and coast, although unusually for Indonesia, there is no ethnic divide. The residents of the two zones acknowledge that they descend from a single source, and they speak the same language. The coastal Lauje and those living in the foothills are Muslim, while many of those further inland have become Christian under mission influence in the past two decades. Very few of the hill dwellers speak any Indonesian or go to school. Among them, one might expect to find united communities of proud and perhaps defiant mountaineers, indigenous cultures and institutions intact, but my findings indicate otherwise. One might also expect to find self-sufficient economies, but, as it turns out, food production is vulnerable to failure during periods of drought, illness or political disruption, and hill people have long sold forest and farm products, as well as labor, on the coast. Local officials emphasize difference and separation, rather than connections, when discussing plans for development. This is so whether they describe the hills as empty (bar a few inconsequential tribesmen) and available for commercial tree crop plantations, or recognize the density of the hillside population while stressing their unruly, backward nature and the need for government intervention to transform them into "normal" citizens.
In the pre-colonial period, and extending into the colonial period in areas like this where rule was light and indirect, coastal chiefdoms sought control over people rather than territory. More specifically, they sought to monopolize trade to and from the interior, and some exacted tribute or corvee labor. These goals could be difficult to realize where land was sufficiently abundant for people to abandon trade altogether, or remove themselves to the hinterland of another, more accommodating coastal regime. But there is mounting evidence that interior groups positioned themselves within the orbit of coastal powers for reasons of their own. These included the push factors (disease, famine, feuding) already noted, and the attractions of trade goods, the freedom to visit coastal markets, and participation in ritual ! 2 complexes led by coastal chiefs with spiritual powers. They also included -and still include -3 the perceived benefits of order, security and belonging which derive from forms of rule backed by external authorities, from stranger-kings to colonial or national bureaucrats. In their contemporary configuration, they may appear as demands for access to public infrastructure and "development." Their own in one sense, such desires are formed historically and relationally in and through processes of interaction. Thus, as Robert Hefner observed in mountain Java, economic relations are intimately bound up with "community, morality and power" (1990:2) , and with the question of "what sort of person to be" as identities shift and commitments are reconfigured in a changing world (1990:242) . By pealing away at the layers of political, economic and cultural formation, my account seeks to illuminate how this question has been framed and addressed in this particular corner of Sulawesi.
I begin by drawing some conceptual leads from two recent, broadly provocative discussions of upland-lowland dynamics in the region offered by political scientist James Scott and historian Anthony Reid, and relating them to historical conditions around the Gulf of Tomini. In the next two sections I examine the formative effects of rule and market relations on the people of the Lauje hills. Finally, I examine the ways in which difference is configured and deployed in everyday encounters and in the envisioning of hillside "development."
Interrogating Upland Formations
In a recent work James Scott (1998) highlights the contrast between "state space", in the cities and rice producing lowlands of Southeast Asia where people and places are rendered "legible" or bureaucratically visible through technologies such as maps and census, and "nonstate space" in the interior. There, governing regimes from the pre-to the post-colonial have confronted "patterns of settlement, social relations, and production, not to mention a natural environment, that have evolved largely independent of state plans" (Scott 1998:183-4) . This contrast, drawn in bold strokes on a grand scale, invites more refined analysis and raises a series of further questions. Areas such as the Lauje hills fit Scott's nonstate category from the standpoint of legibility. There is no indication that maps, lists or head counts were generated in the pre-colonial or colonial period, and those prepared in recent years are grossly inaccurate, as local officials readily admit. There is still no consistent monitoring of the spatial mobility of individuals, households, or the clusters of households one might loosely call neighborhoods. Yet the hills have not been unaffected by external powers. Indeed, as I will 4 show, the authority of rulers and regimes of rule emanating from or channeled through the small towns along the Lauje coast have been deeply formative of hillside economies and identities. If not by means of legibility, what are the forms through which power over the interior has been exercised? What are the implicit forms of knowledge and practice on which it depends? Where the mechanisms of rule are -like the people and terrain -largely undocumented, how can we uncover their effects on modes of life in the hills, past and present? Further, since the extraction of produce from the hills and hinterlands has been one of the main incentives for the involvement of pre-colonial chiefdoms and subsequent colonial and national regimes, how has this been instituted and sustained in the absence of legibility?
Besides indicating illegibility, Scott uses the term nonstate to highlight resistance, suggesting that the inhabitants of nonstate spaces have fled or evaded debt bondage, conscription, taxation or the equivalent, modern forms of discipline imposed by central authorities (Scott 1998:187) . While this scenario fits some upland locales, I would argue that it cannot be generalized. Even the Meratus Dayak of Kalimantan as described by Anna Tsing (1993), who exemplify "nonstate" for Scott, require a more complex interpretation. Like the Lauje, the Meratus practice shifting cultivation and continue to live and move about in ways that are illegible to the government administrators nominally responsible for them. But they are not an autonomous group resisting outside authority. Rather, according to Tsing, Meratus "have lived on the border of state power and Banjar regionalism for centuries and have elaborated a marginality that has developed in dialogue with state power and regional politics" (1993:29). They recognize their "local traditional culture" to be an extension of state administration (1993:31) . Their leaders "require state rhetoric to build their authority and gather communities " (1993:27) . Thus their lifeways are formed not outside state agendas but relationally, in and through them. Ironically, "it is this elaboration of marginality that regional officials mistake for an isolated, primitive tradition" (1993:29) . Even in illegible spaces, it appears, resistance and a desire for isolation cannot be assumed.
Examining the stance of interior people towards coastal people and authorities has become even more significant in the light of a recent paradigm-shifting synthesis of historical sources by Anthony Reid (1997) . Reid shows that the interiors of all of Indonesia's major islands were not idle or sparsely populated backwaters but rather the focus of population concentration, production, and, in some cases, elaborate forms of social organization in the pre-colonial period. Historians, Reid argues, have been "misled by the glitter of states ... in written sources both external and internal, and by the silence of these same sources about the populous interior ... [thus] we continue to write histories in which [highlanders] are extremely marginal actors, at best the people of the ulu who occasionally sent their goods, tribute, and slaves down the rulers of the river-ports" (1997:67) . Rather than a coastal population 5 expanding (or escaping) into the interior where they might encounter a few isolated tribesmen, Reid argues that Indonesia's historical demography has been the reverse.
Although the Austronesians who spread out from southern China to people the archipelago four thousand years ago must have arrived by sea (Bellwood 1997) , until this century, according to Reid, coastal zones were sparsely settled. The reasons were their low 6 productivity for agriculture (the forest hard to burn and land prone to flood), exposure to disease (malaria, endemic below six hundred meters, smallpox repeatedly imported, typhoid, cholera), risk of attack by raiders and slavers, and the unpredictable demands of court centers.
The interior, by contrast, offered more security. Livelihoods were based on the swidden rice techniques the Austronesians already knew, and the taro and wild sago they found in place (Bellwood 1997:241-254) . The resilient and productive New World crops corn and cassava, imported via the Philippines early in the seventeenth century, spread rapidly across the uplands of the archipelago from east to west, supporting denser populations (Boomgaard 1999) . Only with the changed political conditions brought about by the Pax Neerlandica as the Empire was "rounded out"early this century, and with investments in smallpox vaccination, drainage and irrigation, did people begin to move in large numbers from the crowded and impoverished interior towards the coastal cities and plains (Reid 1997:82) . A mundane but significant correlate of all this, noted by Reid, is that "Cities such as Palembang and Jambi were fed entirely with rice from the headwaters of the rivers of which they controlled the outlet" (1997:69) . That is, they were not fed by lowland rice producers pinned down in legible spaces by the exercise of power, but rather by the unruly and uncivilized interior populations they so thoroughly despised.
Reid's analysis, like Scott's, is formulated in generalizing mode and does not apply to the same extent in every case. The dense interior populations of Sumatra described by Reid were concentrated in upland valleys and fertile plateaux, a very different scenario from Sulawesi's steep and rugged slopes. Yet the questions it raises are important. Where 7 populations have historically been concentrated in the uplands, as they have in the Lauje case, we need to ask not what drove them there or kept them in isolation, but what attracted so many people out and down to the coasts and plains in this century? We also need to reevaluate the trajectories through which some people come to be defined as different. Those who moved out to the coast and adopted new ways, including Islam, would have a significant interest in the construction of rigid social boundaries to confirm their difference from the stillbackward interior. People who remained behind, on the other hand, might develop oppositional identities or they might, just as likely, see themselves as essentially the same as coastal folk, differing only in their assessment of the costs and benefits of intensifying relations with coastal powers.
Around the Gulf of Tomini, the area to which I now turn, the Netherlands East Indies Company (VOC) contended for control with Ternate and Spain in the seventeenth century (Henley 1994:22) and built outposts in the mid eighteenth century but these were later abandoned (Henley 1996:42) . Forest products were exported and coastal chiefdoms, to profit from this trade, found it neither necessary nor desirable to confine the movements of the interior populations. According to Velthoen (1997:369, 377-8) , trade in its violent variants was enforced and protected by bands of armed men, especially in the 1780-1850 period when Sulu became the center of a network of long distance raiders responding to international pressures to increase the supply of commodities and slaves. Enforcement and protection were necessary because trade goods were given out some months in advance of forest product delivery.
Relations between coastal and inland groups "varied between loose tributary relations that facilitated economic exchange to mutual hostile attacks between headhunting and raiding groups" (1997:370) . Faced with coercion, inland groups had two options: withdraw to the forests, dealing with the hardships imposed by disrupted agricultural production, or ally with a leader or ruler with a reputation for military strength, protected by the armed men who were raiding other areas (1997:371) .
The Wana people in the hills on the southern side of the Gulf of Tomini probably represent the limit case of the withdrawal option yet even they have a history of connection which influences the present. According to Jane Atkinson's account, the hike across the peninsula inhabited by the Wana takes eight to nine days in good weather (1989:22) . Wana describe themselves as cowardly, the victims rather than the perpetrators of headhunting attacks in the past, prone to take to the forest when threatened, and determined avoiders of Dutch resettlement schemes (1989:262-3) . But the now dispersed and egalitarian Wana were, in the nineteenth century, part of a political system centered on the coast, complete with named ranks and debt slaves. Wana chiefs in this hierarchy played a role in the instigation and blessing of headhunting raids, the negotiation of peace and the mediation of disputes (1989:304) . Recognizing that the Wana could not have been coerced into submission to the Raja of Bungko, Atkinson argues that some Wana -perhaps not all -elected to form such ties to benefit from the promise of ritually enhanced fertility, prosperity and security during a period of chronic regional warfare. The coastal raja was also the source of insecurity: Wana were enslaved when they could not pay their debts under the adat (customary) dispute settlement system the Raja had instituted (1989:309-11) . Be that as it may, Wana whose settlements fragmented with the waning of chiefly power under the Pax Neerlandica look back nostalgically not to an original condition of autonomy but to the period when they had been included in the Raja's realm. Their rejection of Dutch efforts to settle them down in this century was shaped by these experiences (Atkinson 1989:299, 312) . It reflects their assessment of what the Dutch had to offer, rather than a rejection of rule as such.
Mediation in disputes in the interior was a prominent element of pre-colonial relations of rule in this region (Velthoen 1997:371) , obliging us to rethink the model which views coastal authority as an intrusion upon interior communities that were already formed. Though the intensity varied, feuding, fragmentation and flight were widespread in the interior in previous centuries, and it was, in many areas, external authority which enabled people to form the stable sets of relations we think of as community.
Dispute settlement was a role in which the Dutch sometimes became directly involved. In Minahasa in the seventeenth century, according to David Henley, VOC attempts to bring order to the fractious interior by placing one highland group in a position of authority over others brought disaster because the favored chiefs tried to behave like despots (1996:36) . The solution the Dutch devised was for the VOC itself to supply "a fixed external framework to hold the rivalries of the Alfurs in balance" (1996:35) . A Dutch memoir from 1682 observes: "They fight with each other over nothing, and war, once ignited, spreads through all the villages like a bush fire. Each man chooses sides according to his own notions or interests, or simply with a view to obtaining heads ... When such a fire breaks out we immediately send some of our own people, preferably those with knowledge of the local customs and languages, to douse it. Because the Company's judgment is regarded here as oracular, even serious conflicts can be resolved by our mediation." (cited in Henley 1996:35) . In other parts of Sulawesi where their presence was much less intense than in Minahasa, the Dutch were nevertheless positioned at the apex of "indigenous" hierarchies, key players in succession wars and disputes, and this during the centuries of "abstention" when the Dutch thought they were leaving indigenous processes untouched (Schrauwers 1997) .
The mediating role could, of course, be manipulated. Schrauwers (1997) argues that coastal powers (including the Dutch) used the tactic of divide and rule, fomenting the conflicts they were then called upon to resolve. In Toraja in the late nineteenth century coastal chiefs played upland chiefs against each other to generate slaves as well as secure coffee monopolies (Bigalke 1983) . There were also economic incentives embedded in the dispute settlement process itself. Fines imposed by coastal chiefs or their representatives in the hills had to be paid in imported trade goods such as cloth or brass trays over which coastal chiefs held the monopoly. Thus they served to enrich coastal powers both directly and indirectly, as hill folk were incorporated into commodity circuits (Schrauwers 1997) . In the Lauje area, fines (and bridewealth payments) had to be paid in "plates of a breakable kind." The regional literature 8 thus directs our attention to the relational histories, the particular blends of coercion and attraction, that embedded coastal authority in the formation of communities, identities, and economies in the interior.
In the nineteenth century the Lauje occupied the hills between two sets of raiders and traders: a prominent group based at Tombuku which operated along the Gulf, and another group which was based at Toli-toli on the northern coast of the peninsula until they were driven out by the Dutch in 1822, only to return (Velthoen 1997:378) . The Lauje were less isolated than the Wana, less significant pawns and players in pre-colonial political and economic struggles than the highlanders of Poso (Schrauwers 1997 ), or Toraja (Bigalke 1983 and very much less deeply inscribed by the colonial regime than Minahasa (Henley 1996) . Their experiences with systems of trade and rule fall somewhere within this regional array and are made more interesting by the dependence of coastal dwellers on the rice and corn the hill folk supplied from their distant swiddens, and by their early involvement in the production of an agricultural export: tobacco. The low rainfall on the coastal belt made the dry foothills especially suited to this crop (Henley 1997:98) . Tobacco was recorded in shipments through Gorontalo in the early nineteenth century. According to a Dutch visitor, so much tobacco was grown and exported that it made Tinombo "the largest trading place in Mooeton" (Moutong) (Hoevell 1892:354) . Yet the intensive production of this New World crop seems to have 9 flourished in the Lauje hills for almost two centuries without either people or place being enmeshed in routinized administrative structures by the coastal elites that undoubtedly profited from the trade or the Dutch who controlled exports through their enclave at Gorontalo. What then are the relations of rule that have connected the Lauje hills to coastal centers in different periods? What are the political-economic arrangements that have enabled the extraction of forest products, agricultural commodities, food and labor from the hills in the absence of the legibility afforded by maps, census, and related forms of discipline? Assuming that their engagements have been two-sided, if uneven, what have hill people sought to gain from their links with coastal populations and governing regimes?
Forms and Effects of Rule in the Lauje Hills
Precolonial relations of rule are difficult to reconstruct for the Lauje hills due to the dearth of written records. There was no mission presence in the hills until 1977, and there was no Dutch official in Tinombo town except for a brief period in the 1930s. The Dutch visitor of 1892 already cited did not hike into the hills. He reported on what the coastal elite told him: the hill folk were peaceable and did not hunt heads, a situation confirmed by his observation that coastal houses lacked fortification. Nevertheless, they were feared by the coastal dwellers for 10 their skill with poisoned darts. They were often asked for help in disputes between the coastal kingdoms, but they rarely involved themselves. They normally lived spread out in their swiddens, cultivating padi, millet and tobacco. Van Hoevell reports a hillside population of ten thousand, an indication that his informants recognized the hills to be quite densely farmed and settled (Hoevell 1892:349-360) .
Lauje origin stories declare that their ancestors emerged magically in the hills and lived there until the end of the eighteenth century, fear of pirates and slavers restricting their visits to the coast to hasty expeditions to make salt (Nourse 1999:55, 129) . The Tomini Bay was peripheral to the spice trade and its monopolies, but there may have been a trace: a story recorded in the hills by Nourse (1999:60) tells of traders visiting to obtain cinnamon for the Raja of Ternate, the destruction of cinnamon trees by angry enforcers, followed by a long period when traders ceased to visit their shores. Then, the offspring of the Lauje's magical mountain ancestors separated in all directions and one converted to Islam and went down to the coast at Tinombo, where she married a foreigner, probably a Kaili warrior. From this mixed union, and other unions with Mandar and Bugis, a coastal trading class and self-styled Lauje aristocracy emerged. 11 The pretensions and activities of the coastal aristocracy have been well described by Jennifer Nourse (1999) . Although some contemporary descendents claim that this was an autochtonous Lauje system of government in which all Lauje were incorporated, Nourse's careful analysis of historical sources and contemporary ritual practices suggest otherwise. First of all, and most obviously, the Lauje's aristocratic titles are found in Gorontalo, which in turn imported much of its political vocabulary from Ternate, indicating histories of connection rather than a pure Lauje "tradition" (Henley 1996:28; Nourse 1999:59, 232n14) . Second, the ritual knowledge of the olongian, the magic which enables the incumbent of this office (often a woman) to secure the health and fertility of people and crops, is acknowledged by at least some Lauje aristocrats to have been learned from the in-marrying Kaili (Nourse 1999:141, 172, 185) . Third, it is doubtful that the olongian's reach penetrated all parts of the hills in any routine form. Some groups elected to send tribute or contributions to a ritual event, but it is hard to see how tribute could have been enforced. Contemporary uplanders express their economic exchanges with former coastal chiefs in terms of the mutual obligations of siblingship -obligations which were sometimes contravened or ignored (Nourse 1999:60-63, 196-7) .
Whatever the extent and depth of the olongian's reach in the hills in the past, many contemporary hill folk expressed to me their enthusiasm for the idea of an orderly, hierarchical and comprehensive system of government. Enthusiasm among the coastal aristocrats was to be expected since this was their golden era. But I was surprised when a group far up in the headwaters of the Siang river proudly outlined a "traditional" organizational chart which had a single olongian presiding at the top; a forum called the Babato comprising the sub-olongians who ruled in each district; the Mpangata, made up of the chiefs of customary affairs from each district; the Walaapulu, its secretariat; the Madinu, responsible for social affairs; the Wukum, responsible for customary law; the Kapitalau, chief of affairs on the coast; the Jogugu, his assistant; Tadulako, who keep the peace; the Kapitan, responsible for public health, and Pasobo, in charge of agriculture. In some versions there were also olongians in the hills, cooperating as co-equals with those on the coast, a construction which challenges the notion of a singular hierarchy centered on the coast, but emphasizes coastal connections all the same. Notably, the descriptions I was given always included reference to contemporary, governmental equivalents: "he was like the Minister for Information", "that is like the district head", "this one was the Minister for Justice", "the Chief of Security" and so on. Thus it was not hillside autonomy but the idea of systematic government that enabled Lauje reflecting on these matters to imagine a time when "the Lauje" were a proudly united and well-organized community. Implicitly, this version of the past expresses the embarrassment of Lauje both in the hills and on the coast about their current collective poverty, disorder, and lack of "development". It is also, again implicitly, a critique of the national government apparatus which, many Lauje argue, should be taking a more decisive role in hillside affairs. Thus traces of this former system of rule are active in the present, but unevenly so. Some hill folk I asked said they had never heard of an olongian. In their view, government began with the Dutch.
Until 1905, colonial rule in the Lauje area was light and indirect. Lauje aristocrats were vassals of the Raja of Moutong, who was vassal to the Raja of Gorontalo, who in turn paid tribute to the Dutch based in Gorontalo city (Nourse 1999:237n4, 241n16) . Then, to intensify administration as part of the "rounding out of empire", the Dutch appointed a Bugis from Moutong as Raja and installed him in a palace in Tinombo town. In so doing, the Dutch 12 overlooked the Lauje olongian and other aristocrats who lived in the coastal village of Dusunan across the river from Tinombo (Nourse 1999:55-57) . Soon after the first Raja was appointed, an attempt was made to resettle Lauje from the hills to the dry, narrow coastal plain. Those who obeyed this command were devastated by malaria and by hunger as food production was disrupted. After a few years, the survivors were permitted to return to the hills (Nourse 1999:65-66) . Thereafter, the Raja had two main responsibilities in relation to the hill population. He was to facilitate the extraction of labor, taxes, and forest products (discussed in the next section), and he was to keep the peace. It was the latter, apparently mundane task that embedded government authority in the everyday lives of people in the interior and transformed the way they conducted their affairs.
Why should peace and order be so significant in the hills? There is no record or recollection that Lauje have ever formed stable, bounded communities. They live scattered in their swiddens, and are loosely associated in neighborhoods formed around clusters of kin. 13 Households move every three years or so, roughly the life of a swidden and the small bamboo and thatch, or bark and plank house built upon it. If they plan to grow rice, people try to coordinate the timing with their neighbors and clear adjacent plots in order to "share the birds" and other pests, and they cooperate in labor exchange. But in some parts of the hills the land is too poor or the people too scattered or preoccupied with other activities for rice production, and corn and root crops are the staples, produced by individual households according to their own idiosyncratic rhythms and preferences. Rain in the hills is erratic, and prolonged droughts force farmers to retreat to the forest to prepare wild sago, rely on the wild root ondot (Diascorea Hispida), or go down to the coast to find work. Harvest festivals and collective rites for the protection and people and crops are not routine, and seem to be difficult to organize due to a marked diffidence about leadership. Of course one cannot determine whether productive activities and community relations of the past were more coherent, but hill people describing to me the difficulties of gathering people together and channeling collective action did not make this case. They argued, on the contrary, that the authority of government was necessary to make hill folk cooperate and conform. 14 Far from a vision of stability, tales told to me about the past refer frequently to tensions and feuds within or between kin clusters. These were settled by violence or flight. Lauje from the headwaters of the river Siavu described the time of their ancestors as one dominated by fear. There was feuding within the hills, restricting travel. They were at war with the people in the headwaters of the Siang, and still have little to do with them. From the Siang side, I was told about "troublemakers" from the Siavu. One man described in detail the multiple moves made by his family to avoid confrontation by living in isolation in the forest, later moving on to find kin support. These were times of hardship for his family, when they were forced to depend on sago and beg or barter for corn from kin who were settled enough to farm consistently. According to the New Tribes missionaries, when they began their work in the hills in 1977 people were afraid to move freely, and preferred to be accompanied by a local representative of "government". Disputes between but also within neighborhoods arose over women (adultery, failed marriage proposals), over dogs, over forest resources (rattan, resin trees), and over threats or insults.
Dutch rule, in the rather mild form that it took in these hills, offered a partial solution to these problems. Hill folk recalled: "In the old days there was fighting because people were not afraid of the government. Now it is safe because the government is strong"; "Before there was government, people did not gather to discuss things, they just fought it out". Conditions of violence are still said to prevail in the more distant headwaters, where government is weak, and people express a fear that violence will re-emerge. For these reasons, some say "whatever comes from the government, we follow it. Government cannot be opposed. We are under their leadership. That is why we have people appointed as representatives of the government, to keep things peaceful". Thus a conception of themselves as headstrong people who prefer to go their separate ways, and who need outside authority if they are to form communities and live at peace with one another, is deeply embedded in hillside identities and configures the practices of everyday life. Note that the capacity to provide "peace and order" to warring tribes and those suffering in the hands of indigenous despots was central to the way the Dutch colonial government justified its rule, and New Order was the name of Suharto's regime. Similarly, the New Tribes Mission sees the creation of harmonious communities as a central goal. This neither confirms feuding as primordial Lauje tradition nor does it mean that outsiders' images of their past have colonized the Lauje imagination. It does point, however, to the relational histories through which identities are formed and ideas about community take shape.
The system of rule imposed by the Dutch via the Raja worked by selecting hillside Lauje of renown and appointing them to the position of ward head (kepala jaga) over the interior. The ward head's task was to mediate between coast and hills, to convey government instructions and demands to hillside locales and also, perhaps even more important, to bring the weight of government to dispute settlement processes, if necessary marching recalcitrants down to the coast for formal arrest. Tales are told about famous ward heads who were brave enough to mediate between warring factions, or to travel deep into the hills to arrest men accused of murder (sometimes murder of close kin). Charisma, magic, stamina, knowledge of the terrain, and wider-than-usual social networks were important qualifications for this task, but most crucial of all was the backing of coastal authorities, the sense that they were the appointed vehicles for an external power.
Past and present day administrative divisions cross cut from the coast to the hills. Today each desa (a unit of about two-to five thousand people under a headman) includes a slice of the coastal strip and a slice of the hills. In some cases, the desa extends to the center of the peninsula, although the interior borders are vague, and many uplanders continue to define their desa membership in terms of loyalties to particular desa headmen. The ward head has been replaced by the heads of the desa sub-divisions (dusun and RT) but to communicate with people in the headwaters and to help resolve serious disputes, desa headmen still rely upon individuals of renown, disregarding the nominal territorial sub-divisions as well as the literate but generally less effective official appointees. Below the ward head in the older governmental hierarchy, and now below the heads of the desa subdivisions, is the kepala adat, chief of customary affairs, responsible for every day dispute settlement. This position continues to be important but not because it embodies unchanging, autochtonous Lauje custom. Kepala adat emphasize that outside power is necessary for them to solve local problems. While they take pride in their mediating and oratorical skills and their capacity to resolve cases without referring them to higher authorities, the existence of a hierarchy above them is crucial to their efforts. "If we cannot resolve it here, we go to the RT head, then to the dusun head, then if that fails, straight down to the desa headman -then to the police and the jail -that is for the really hard-headed cases -those who don't want to listen."
The content of the judgments made by kepala adat is a mixture of precedent and improvisation, but the labels used to classify various types of offense (wrong step, wrong speech, wrong hand and so on) and the system of fines are said to have originated with the coastal authorities. Some kepala adat are autocratic and permit no one in the assembled 15 crowd to speak during a case or publicly dispute their ruling. Others operate more as primus inter pares, gathering senior men to hear cases with them, and asking the assembled crowd to acclaim the resolution devised. In this as in many other matters, there is no fixed Lauje way of doing things. There is only a minimal structure, of which the all-important feature is that it is externally imposed.
Coercion and Desire in Market Relations
Scott's argument that ruling regimes intent on the extraction of labor and produce must devise ways to reduce and monitor people's mobility builds on the argument made by Michael Dove (1985) . According to Dove, only after uplanders have been forced to occupy reduced areas of land, excluded from access to forest resources, relocated to alien locales or marshaled into debt bondage, corvee or tax obligations, can their labor be systematically exploited. For many areas of Southeast Asia, including parts of the northern arm of Sulawesi under consideration here, this argument is correct. In the pre-colonial period, it was the need for labor which caused the rajas of Gorontalo to conduct slave raids in the hills along the Gulf of Tomini and concentrate a substantial population in the Limboto depression where they were forced to work irrigated rice (Henley 1994 :42 citing Van Hoevell 1891 . In the territory that became Minahasa, the Dutch found the mediation of coastal chiefs an inefficient means to secure rice for their garrisons, and so began to intervene directly in the interior, beginning in the seventeenth century (Henley 1996:31-2) . They set about reordering people and territory in precisely the way Scott describes. With the introduction of coffee to the highlands as a compulsory crop in 1822, Minahasa was subjected to an "unprecedented level of colonial surveillance and control" (1996:38) and became "the most intensive colonial administration anywhere in the Dutch Indies" (1996:50). But in the Lauje area, significant quantities of labor and produce have been mobilized from the hills over a period of two centuries without displacing the residents from their land or enmeshing them in a systematic administrative regime. Given that the possibility of flight to the inner hills still remains, coercion cannot be the whole story. Here I examine the mechanisms involved in the extraction of forest products, labor, the cash crop tobacco, and the staples rice and corn.
For coastal chiefs or merchants to profit from forest products, the confinement of the collectors or their adoption of coastal religions and lifestyles would be counterproductive (Healey 1985) . Difference is built into patterns of production and exchange. The Lauje who collect forest products live deep in the interior, and the cultural gap between them and the coastal Lauje is extreme. Unlike the Penan, who perform this work in Borneo, the Lauje of the headwaters are not considered ethnically distinct -only grossly uncivilized. They are labeled bela, which can mean friend or trading partner, but is generally used as a term of derision. From the 1930s, according to the recollection of a merchant's clerk, bela would hike down to the coast and contract with a merchant to collect a particular product (eg damar resin) at an agreed price. They used the money to pay their taxes, and to buy other basics such as salt, knife blades, and clothing.
The imposition of taxes when Dutch rule was established in 1905 certainly stimulated the extraction of forest products. Seen another way, it was the possibility of obtaining cash from the sale of forest products which enabled hill folk to pay their taxes and thereby place themselves within the orbit of the new governmental system -if they so desired. Once they 16 had paid up they were "free to go down to the market." Those who refused to pay risked harassment if they ventured to the coast, and conducted their market transactions through intermediaries. Desa headmen took advantage of the hill peoples' respect for their authority, and of their role in tax collection, to draw highlanders within their sphere of influence and to instigate profitable trade relations. As one member of the coastal elite explained:
You couldn't make the bela work -they are like wild chickens of the forest. We were afraid to go up there. Some died up there without ever paying tax. The former headman used to coax them, gently... In 1934 he went up into the furthest interior with a ward head respected by the bela. After that, many came down for the first time. They stayed at the headman's house. It was full of people. 50 or 60 came down at a time. He told them to bring rattan, cinnamon and damar. That way he had all of them within his realm. He was the one who tamed them. Before that, some of them had never brought down damar and they had never seen the sea. The extraction of labor from the hills depends upon similarly intricate collaborations between desa headmen and their representatives in the interior, blurring the boundary between the official and private roles of government functionaries and drawing on the authority of government to lubricate commerce and channel profits. Since there is little paid work available for hill folk in their own desa, those seeking significant sums to pay taxes, accumulate funds for bridewealth or to meet other needs must leave home for a period of months to work for large enterprises, mainly in forest extraction. Rattan and wood were coming down from the hills on a sufficient scale early this century for a Dutch freighter company to send two of its largest ships monthly through the Gulf of Tomini, and a German company also kept ships there. Not all the workers were local: a Dutch source observed that some of the men came from the hills around Palu (Heerdt 1914:752) . Nevertheless, hundreds of Lauje men were employed in ebony camps between 1920 and 1980, working in large, highly supervised labor crews accommodated in barracks, fed a daily ration, and paid a daily wage. Rattan extraction employed thousands in the 1980s, and, since the rattan was exhausted, the work of hauling building timber out from the forest has taken its place, both of these on a piecework basis. Men have also been recruited as labor for the burgeoning tree crop sector, both in the region and as far away as Kalimantan.
Cash advances have been the key mechanism used to recruit hillside labor. The prospective employer seeks workers through an agent, enticing them with an immediate payment commonly amounting to one or two month's pay. From the moment the advance is received (the bait), the worker is, according to local metaphor, "hooked": caught like a fish on a line. Some still obtain cash at the end of their period of wage labor, others return with debts that can only be redeemed by further work. The local expression for this condition is to be tied down, or, more graphically, tied at the throat. In many cases the money is spent within a few days of receipt, sometimes through gambling binges organized by the labor recruiters themselves. Yet despite its recognized disadvantages hillside Lauje consider this system 17 "customary," and rarely leave home without an advance.
The risks of giving cash advances to mobile hill folk are mitigated by the close relationship between labor recruiters and desa officials: often they are the same people. Entrepreneurs prefer to use labor recruiters who are part of the local administrative structure: the desa headman or secretary, or someone closely related to them. The recruiters in turn give advances to their representatives in the interior -the ward head or equivalent. This approach reduces the risk of default by the recruiters themselves (who handle large sums of cash as advances) and also by the hill folk who fear to cross officials and prefer to be under their protection. The coercive dimension of the official connection is direct. Men who had not paid their taxes were reportedly forced by desa officials to work in the ebony camps. Until recently, desa residents needed a letter from the headman in order to travel in search of work. Those who do not have valid identity cards and who speak little or no Indonesian are still vulnerable to harassment by police, army, and other officials. But the role of desire, specifically desire for incorporation as members of a team led or authorized by a desa official, and desire to be free to "go down to the market" rather than hide in the hills, is equally important. These forms of discipline do not appear as an external force but are built into everyday understandings and practices -ideas about "what sort of person to be".
Taxes were less important in the extraction of labor for the rattan boom of the 1980s, but desa officials and their hillside intermediaries were still deeply involved as labor recruiters and traders. Gambling was organized as soon as advances were paid, under the protection of the local police and army officers, each taking their cut. Paying high prices for the supplies they needed while in the forest and gambling along the way, many men went home after months of rattan collection with serious debts, and soon returned to tied labor. Even when clear of debt, they recommitted themselves to a trader through a new advance. One reason they gave, apart from the desirability of the cash, was the logic of gravity: rattan that has come down "will not go back up again". Without a commitment from a rattan "boss" to purchase the load at a given price a person would encounter some very low offers for the rattan so laboriously hauled to the collection point.
Tobacco production, so significant in the Lauje area in the period 1800 -1970, was subject to another configuration of coercion and desire. Tobacco can only be grown in the dry foothills, facilitating the collection of taxes, but the main mechanism of extraction was monopolistic trade enforced by debt. Although tobacco is a "cash crop", former tobacco farmers recall that cash was seldom seen. As soon as the new tobacco plants were in the ground, the family would begin to take rice, sugar, and clothing on credit from their tobacco trader. This continued throughout one growing cycle and was carried over to the next. The family tried to keep the debt down by growing corn higher in the hills where rainfall is more abundant but conflicting labor demands and the necessity of staying close to the tobacco precluded adequate food production. Dependence on credit was therefore routine, and a "good" trader would also help out in special circumstances such as illness, death or crop failure. Many tobacco farmers gambled with cash they did not have, increasing their debts to the trader who bailed them out (and who may have organized the gambling himself ). As one farmer wryly observed: "so many people down there became rich from our tobacco, I know that for a fact". Why then did farmers stay in place to keep producing this crop? The ecological limitations have been noted: a farmer who fled to the interior could no longer grow tobacco. Questions of identity and difference also figured importantly. Tobacco farmers lived perforce in the hills, since their crop required continuous attention, but their social orientation was towards the coast and Islam. Escape to a life in the heathen headwaters, far from mosque and market, held little attraction for them. It was these relational considerations that served to keep people in their place. 18 Food is the other significant export from the hills. As far as I can tell, the food trade was not regulated by desa authorities or subject to monopoly, extortion or other forms of entrapment, and it has left no bureaucratic traces. Nevertheless, it underpinned the entire set of relations linking coast and hills for the past two centuries, and continues to be significant. From the time the first Lauje began to live permanently on the coast, trading and producing copra, and in the dry foothills for tobacco, they must have relied upon food from the interior to meet their subsistence needs for at least part of the year. Imports of rice were not routine until the 1950s and, even then, most coastal dwellers could not afford to purchase it. Thus hillside food production both enabled the development of specialized commodity niches and made the trade in commodities more profitable, since the producers were fed from other sources.
Difference and desire figure in the food trade in complex ways and the terms under which it should be conducted are the subject of debate. Some hillsiders argue that food may 19 be bartered, but should not be sold for cash since this is taboo or would, at the very least, cause the seller to regret transforming the product of their labor into such a base medium. Others say it is fine to sell food, even rice, so long as the appropriate harvest ritual has been completed. Some emphasize that the price should be modest, since a purchaser who has hiked so far must be needy. Food is sometimes given as a gift, but even among close kin generosity has limits. Normally, a person looking for food expects to pay for it in cash or barter with dried fish and coconuts purchased at the coastal market, or other goods they have to hand: a chicken, some used clothing, a knife blade, a new sarong. Whatever the terms of trade, those who 20 have produced a bumper crop of corn welcome purchasers, since the price it could fetch at the market would barely cover the porterage fee and the surplus would only rot.
Food transactions are equally complex from the purchasers' viewpoint. On the one hand, the groups of thirty or more who hike up from the coast and foothills in search of food are clearly supplicants: if they had enough food themselves, or the money to purchase it at the market, they would not venture so far from home. Use of the cheap option displays a degree of desperation. On the other hand, it displays market savvy: striking a good bargain is evidence of their skill and the gullibility of backward hill folk who do not know the true value of goods. Profiting from this (imputed) ignorance, but also putting in hard labor as porters, some resell the corn they have acquired in the hills when they reach the coast. Thus, from a coastal perspective, dependence on hill folk for food may still be tinged with derision. The experience is colored by the long and difficult hike, and fear of people who live so differently, especially bela whose dress, demeanor and food do not conform to coastal styles. Friendly relationships may also be formed or confirmed through these trading expeditions as people go back to a place where they are known from previous encounters.
In lieu of legibility, the relations of production and exchange forged between the Lauje hills and coast are built upon shifting configurations of coercion and desire. Hill farmers retain the capacity to enter and exit the wage labor force, and expand or reduce cash crop production as demands and opportunities present themselves, although the mechanisms of entrapment are formidable. Employers can call upon a reserve army of labor when needed, but the price is relatively high: Rp3-5000 was the daily male wage in C. Sulawesi in 1996, compared to Rp1-2000 in labor-abundant Java. Coastal profits are enhanced by the subsidy hillside food production supplies. It would be wrong, however, to attribute a singular logic or functionalist design to sets of exchanges which have formed historically through such diverse, culturally mediated engagements.
Producing Difference and Imagining Development
Questions of identity and difference have already arisen in my discussion of relations between coast and hills. I argued that hill folk have constructed their identities and communities in and through the configurations of authority emanating from or channeled through the coastal elites. They have supplied forest products, cash crops, food and labor to the coastal market, paying taxes to secure market access while retaining their ecological niche in the hills, and the marginal social status that derives from it. Tobacco farmers' inclusion in the religious and social sphere of Islam discouraged flight, and tied them to the foothills where they remained for multiple generations despite their impoverishment. For those still in the interior, the attraction of moving further inland to access better swidden and forest resources is balanced by the desire to maintain convenient access to the coastal market. Cultural difference is produced in and through these relations, even as it appears to precede them. In this section, I further examine the ways in which cultural difference is produced, experienced and deployed. Needless to say, the situation looks very different from hill or coastal perspectives. It is also subject to reassessment, as I will demonstrate by examining recent moves to promote hillside "development".
From the hills, my main focus so far, the field of cultural differences in which people locate themselves is quite nuanced. Hill folk describe themselves first and foremost as farmers. Several people told me they could not live on the coast because it is too hot and nothing grows there. Some fear illness caused by bad water or witchcraft, vestiges perhaps of the epidemics that came by sea in decades past. If they had the money, they would like to build a small house there to use as a base on market days and to show the coastal folk that they too have resources. They know the coastal people despise them for living in the hills and for their flimsy bamboo houses. But they compare their own situation favorably to that of laborers on the coast who must hustle daily for wages to pay for every bit of food, and who live in equally flimsy houses built under coconut trees belonging to others. Hill people also judge each other by a set of backward they are considered to be. In many of the hillside neighborhoods I visited, I was warned that the people further inland were primitive, and the forest dense. I was discouraged from visiting: "There will be no one home, they have all gone hunting." "They will be too scared and will run away." "The path to the house is too steep and overgrown; they have dogs that bite". Also mentioned were unpredictability, quick tempers and a tendency to violence especially if scared, threatened or insulted. These tales were repeated far inland, well beyond the boundary that separates Muslims of the foothills from those who eat pork. High in the headwaters, in the very center of the peninsula, it is said that there are people who wear no clothes and have never heard about government or are, perhaps, obstinately resisting rule. 22 Yet however far I walked, the forest frontier and wild folk I was supposed to encounter never materialized. I came to interpret the stories about them as indicators of the hegemony of cultural standards defined on the coast in hill people's assessments of social worth.
There are no pristine primitives or anti-government rebels in the hills, not at least in any of the thirty or so hillside neighborhoods I have visited. Nor do people see themselves in 23 the terms supplied by the indigenous peoples' movement, proudly autonomous communities interested in "alternative" development paths. The goal consistently expressed was for a 24 closer relationship with government authorities and access to facilities currently available only on the coast. Hill folk reject resettlement on practical grounds: there is no land available on the coast, and they must live close to their swiddens to guard them from the wild pigs. But they would like to be on official maps, included in the desa population counts, and made the beneficiaries of "development" hand-outs. To this end some neighborhoods have begun to consolidate their settlement pattern and build more permanent houses in the hope of attracting government attention to their locale. They imagine a future which includes a school, a road, electricity, and routine consumption in a coastal style. Near the New Tribes mission too, where Christian converts are showing a new confidence in their relations with Muslims who have long despised them, people aspire to form a desa of their own so that they can interact directly with the sub-district head and other officials by-passing a desa headman they seriously distrust. Thus they too seek to enmesh themselves more firmly, and more advantageously, within the government administrative system. From a coastal perspective, the view is quite different. I have already mentioned the fear and discomfort of those who have hiked up to the hills under the duress of food-seeking expeditions and their anxieties about encountering people they classify as bela. For the majority of coastal folk who never set foot in the hills, uplanders are typified by the people who come down from the hills for one annual event: Idul Fitri. This is the Muslim holiday to mark the end of the fasting month, and the occasion on which coastal people wear their best clothes, new if possible, assemble in unusually large numbers at the mosque, and eat special, expensive foods such as cookies and cakes. By some logic, perhaps deeply symbolic, perhaps simply perverse, groups of twenty or thirty men, women and children come down to the coast from the furthest hills for this occasion. They go from house to house, asking for treats. Everything about their etiquette is problematic from a coastal point of view. They are clutching blowpipes and bush knives. They are dirty and ragged, and are not invited in to sit down like guests. They don't just take one or two cookies but empty the whole jar into their cloth bundles where wet and dry varieties glue together in a sticky mess. Some coastal dwellers close doors and windows when they see a band headed in their direction. Others prepare a plate of treats but reserve the rest indoors. Children taunt them, "there go the bela, like chickens afraid of the road". They also trick them: "no bela, we do not have any cookies here yet because it is not the right day, but we hear they already have cookies in Palasa, so you had better go there". These are the people about whom stories are told and amplified, the ultimate others who exemplify and embody extreme difference. Their presence renders invisible the Muslims from the foothills, the people from the inner hills who have nice clothes, and the many thousands who do not come down to collect cookies and expose themselves to ridicule. It also obscures the relations of labor and trade which tie hills and coast together.
Consumption is another contact zone, a point at which extreme images of difference are enacted and reconfirmed. Bela are said to spend their money foolishly on gaudy items: a false gold tooth, a hair perm, bright dresses and lipstick, monster cassette players or watches. They do not consume, that is, according to the priorities, styles and tastes of the coast, although they seem to want (and indeed can sometimes afford) expensive consumer goodshence the absurdity. Connected to flashy forms of spending are the anxieties provoked by inordinate and erratic cash flows. The economic standing of a family on the coast is more or less fixed by the range of livelihood sources to which their capital endowment gives them access. People either do or do not own coconut trees. They trade at the high end or the low end. They employ labor or they work for others. There are few surprises. What coastal people see coming down from the hills bewilders them: a pathetic, ragged group comes down to buy a few packs of salt; another comes down and spends millions. The ebbs and flows of upland commodity production that respond to national and international prices as well as climatic cycles and crop disease are here writ small but confusingly on a human terrain. The space is filled by reliance on generalizations and stereotypes, simplifying diversity, and locating the hill people firmly in the savage slot.
Contact at the point of trade also reinforces difference. Coastal people say bela cannot count, or are easily cheated unless someone looks out for them. One man from the foothills who had hiked up to the headwaters in 1959 to trade for garlic and corn described how the people he met there later came down to the coast, and asked for his help to sell their garlic in Tinombo town. "So I went along. They all stayed together, twenty-one of them. Wherever I went, they followed me, all in a line. I was like the group leader. So I arranged the sale then I suggested they buy food and we cooked fish by the river before returning, still in a line." His story has a double edge. The people were smart enough to ask him for help, and paid for it generously, but they paraded along the road behind him like cattle, looking ridiculous. One man close to the mission has bought himself a calculator, and checks the total with the shallot trader. "So now the others won't sell until he arrives to check the price; if they do sell elsewhere they recheck with him, so they will know for sure." Sensible enough, one might say, but taken here as a sign of deficit -dependent folk have to wait around or walk in lines behind the clever one. There is some annoyance with the missionaries for making their followers too smart, so they can no longer be cheated, but this too is turned around to amplify the tale: smart becomes disparaging.
Official knowledge about the hills, even when presented in the standardized formats of national data collection, builds upon the knowledge generated through the everyday encounters between hills and coast already described. While the authority of coastal powers over the hills has been secured, in the modest forms outlined, without benefit of "legibility" and with minimal monitoring of upland lives and livelihoods, ambitious goals such as national development require more detailed information (Scott 1998:184) . Desa officials are now responsible for producing a desa map, and completing the standard desa profile with demographic and economic data that can be aggregated into national statistics. The results are wildly inaccurate, but as Scott (1998: 3) points out, official data collection systems always filter and simplify complex local realities, here perhaps no more or less than in Indonesia's teeming cities. What might be distinctive in each locale are the particular, mediated ways in which official information is obtained and deployed. The desa officials responsible for generating data and supplying it to their superiors are members of the coastal Lauje elite. They lack a panoptic vision, or even a basic topographic map, and some of them have never hiked into the hills. Their sources of information are as mediated and as fragmentary as those of other coastal dwellers. But when they are called upon to speak "authoritatively" to development planners and other visitors, their selections from this common stock of knowledge have especially far-reaching effects.
The maps produced by desa headmen show in detail the neatly aligned houses, mosque, desa office, market place and other facilities of the coast, while the huge desa interior is represented in spatially compressed form with a few vague strokes of the pen. Such maps seldom record the hills, rivers, and other named places by which the interior population could be recognized and made to count in desa plans. In the early days of my research, I was shown these maps, and told by desa headmen that the interior populations were sparse, semi-clothed, residing in trees and under rocks, prone to use poisoned blow-pipes against strangers, and living in a densely forested terrain. Several headmen attempted to dissuade me from venturing inland. They may actually have believed this characterization of the hills. More likely they were concerned that I would fall on the trail, or blame them for the primitive conditions and lack of orderly development. Or they may have preferred to maintain their monopoly over the data supplied to district and provincial administrators, development planners and visiting anthropologists. Now as in the past, it is important for desa headmen to lay claim to large populations, since numbers are the basis on which government resources such as primary schools are distributed. But there are very few schools and no other facilities in the hills. There are several empty school buildings on the coast, conveniently located for those who built them, but useless to the largely illiterate upland population. In the ten desas where Lauje predominate, somewhere between forty and seventy percent of the desa population lives permanently in the hills but the spatial distribution of the desa's population was never mentioned to me by desa officials. They were surprised -and pleased -when my data from the hills indicated that the total desa population was larger than they thought, opening up the possibility of increased desa funding. But it is not only numbers that matter here. Meanings are equally important. When provincial officials visit, desa authorities are quick to classify and describe the population of the hills as primitive. They stress that the people are ever-mobile, and impossible to control. They use the term Dayak, imported from Kalimantan, intended in this context to denote a generic condition of backwardness. They also use the term masyarakat terasing, the official designation for isolated, tribal communities. They confess to the inadequacies of their maps and lists, but argue that they can do no better with limited resources. Data problems only emphasize the difficulties involved in regulating a dispersed and recalcitrant population and the need to rearrange them. 25 Uplanders fare miserably in struggles over meaning. They are branded lazy when not producing commercial crops or when unavailable for wage labor, and feckless when trapped in the attendant debt relations. They are criticized for living in the hills and failing to build compact settlements more convenient for government visitors, but the fact that such arrangements would close down production (and coastal profit) is overlooked. They are said to "produce nothing, just rice and corn" ignoring the significance of this "nothing" to their own nourishment and to the food supply of the coastal zone. Food eaten or exchanged in the ways I described earlier is "nothing" in the sense that it is not weighed by the ton, a visible, countable, profitable product. After I came to know the hills better and could not be put off by tales of backwardness, I would point out these contradictions to desa officials. They readily acknowledged my point, but it was the usual set of stereotypes about the hills which prevailed in discussions among themselves or when they were talking to visitors from the provincial capital, Palu.
Recall that officials who make the six to ten hour journey by paved road from Palu to the small sub-district administrative centers of Tinombo and Palasa could easily be convinced that no one lives in the hills that loom to their left as they drive along the narrow coastal strip. Since the foothills are dry and barren, the hill population is concentrated inland, well out of sight. Unless they hike into the hills themselves, a very rare event, they are dependent on desa officials to identify the needs that should be addressed through state-directed development plans. Visiting officials from the city cannot know, and in my experience seldom question, the 26 filters applied to the facts upon which they must base their decisions. It was in fora such as the annual sub-district development planning meetings attended by desa headmen and officials from Palu that I heard the most stark and derogatory stereotypes about the hills. These included the need to socialize (masyarakatkan) or, more extreme, to humanize (manusiakan) the wild people of the interior. The emphasis on poverty alleviation in national and donor funding initiatives encourages desa officials to remind visitors that their desa interiors are populated by very needy people, urgently requiring assistance. Usually, development for hill folk is envisaged in terms of new settlements with houses neatly aligned, surrounded by productive tree crops in compact gardens, connected by roads to the coast so that officials can provide "guidance". It imagines, that is, commencing from ground zero rather than from the livelihoods, spatial arrangements, and cultural configurations already in place. Here is one vision of the hills, built on tales of wild people and forests, but it is not the only vision.
The image generated by desa headmen of the hills as empty space, inhabited only by a few wandering tribesmen has been modified in the decade since I began my forays into the hills, reflecting changes in the field of interests and power caused by the introduction of tree crops, notably cacao. Tree crops have drawn coastal elites (including desa officials and their kin) into the hills as would-be farmers, and drawn Muslims from the foothills further inland to the terrain of the bela. New proximity is causing some stereotypes to be reinforced while others are revised or perhaps only muted: offended neighbors may accidentally set fire to a garden. Besides their personal interest, desa officials consider the prospect of extensive tree crop production in the hills to be the great source of hope for desa development. Consequently, their relative valuation of spaces and their inhabitants has altered. The landless coconut workers of the coast may live in the prescribed settlement form, but they now find themselves criticized by desa officials for being in the wrong place: they should take some initiative, and go up to the hills to plant cocoa. They are accused of being static and backward. Industrious and successful hill folk are held up to them as examples. Confidence in the capabilities of (some) hill folk to innovate and farm productively is off set by the recognition that the results would be uneven and difficult to monitor. Large scale initiatives still hold their attraction, especially for desa officials who expect to profit from contracts and their "facilitating" role. When higher level officials including district heads and experts from the tree-crop department visit the desa to discuss the economic potential of the hills, desa headmen conveniently ignore hill population and production, stressing the "emptiness" of the hills, and the thousands of hectares available for government schemes or commercial investment.
All of the above scenarios draw upon well-established repertoires of meaning, inflecting them in new ways rather than inventing them ex nihilo. The fields of knowledge and power set up by divergent development agendas co-exist uneasily, their contradictions unresolved. Thus, even when planning appears to demand legibility, there is no singular and coherent government vision determining and ordering the relevant information, but multiple, mediated visions built up over time into particular configurations. Here, attempts to bring about planned change have been rendered complex not because information is lacking, or because the targets of intervention are rebellious or culturally different, but because government officials and those they would constitute as clients are already enmeshed in sets of economic and political relationships in which their own identities, desires and practices are deeply implicated. Such contradictions account, in part at least, for the desultory implementation of legibility projects from statistics to resettlement, and for the amplification of difference, rather than its diminishment, in the context of development planning. 27
Conclusion
Culture does not stand apart from the socially organized forms of inequality, domination, exploitation, and power that exist in society but is implicated in, and inscribed in these practices, which are maintained and contested symbolically as well as instrumentally, discursively as well as forcefully (Coombe 1991:191) . I began this article by citing Doreen Massey on the relational histories through which difference, and the specificity of people and places, is constructed "out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus". In Southeast Asia, I argued, the distinction between coast and interior is the product of centuries of interaction. There are no spaces or people outside the reach of power, but neither is their a uniform saturation. Rather, power works in and through the production of differences inscribed in space and built up through time, as new layers form upon the old. Cultural difference is one of the expressions of historically sedimented relations of power, hence it does not stand apart from "socially organized forms of inequality." It is, rather, formed and inscribed "symbolically as well as instrumentally, discursively as well as forcefully" in the relations of rule, trade, and everyday interaction that I have explored. Thus when governing regimes and other powerful groups classify populations, impute boundaries, and in the case of the uplands, emphasize cultural difference and isolation, they are building on social classifications and moral cartographies that have deep histories and diverse roots. The occlusion of connections is not a mere oversight, but nor is it anything as simple as a coordinated plot.
I have focused on the relational formation of upland communities and identities, but a similar case could be made about the role of the uplands in the fashioning of lowlands and coast, the self-proclaimed centers of authority and style, and the arbiters of civilization. In the national arena too, concepts of development depend upon images of backward people in remote places apparently without history. The category thus constructed must then be filled, and people such as the Lauje seem to fill it, offering planners the satisfaction of beginning from scratch -or so it would appear. Like development planners but for different reasons, activists who support indigenous peoples in their struggles to defend their resource rights also tend to take cultural difference as the starting point for their efforts, in this case because they hope to restore the autonomy and self sufficiency of upland communities. Well meaning though they may be, there is a certain hubris in both these versions of the uplands which needs to be dispelled, giving way to more robust conceptual frameworks and richer, more relational accounts, capable of reflecting the particular dilemmas of "what sort of person to be" in various corners of this vast archipelago. 1 Ferguson (1992) , and Li (1999b) .
For examples of this approach in the Southeast Asian context, see Lynch and Talbot (1995) , 2 Lim (1990) and others discussed in Li (1999b) .
For insightful studies along these lines in Kalimantan see Healey (1985) , Knapen (1997) and 3 Dove (1997) . For Sumatra, see Barbara Andaya (1993a) . For Maluku, see Leonard Andaya (1993b) . Other pan-Indonesian sources cited in Nourse (1999:197) confirm that "those on the periphery … embrace outsiders and external forces" while those in court centers assert boundaries. See David Henley (1997; nd.) on the push factors (disease, famine, warfare) which forced uplanders to engage with coastal powers in northern Sulawesi in the precolonial period. See also his discussion of Minahasan's perspectives on relations with the Dutch as reciprocal (1996:94-99) .
I find Scott's label "nonstate" unfortunate, since it falls too easily into a series with other 4 negatives such as undeveloped and backward, conveying the impression of "people without history" (Wolf 1982) , suspended in time (Fabien 1983) . Moreover it seems to suggest spaces outside the reach of power thus repeating, on a larger spatial canvass, arguments Scott has made previously about everyday forms of resistance being generated and performed by autonomous "actors" off-stage. See Moore (1998) and Mitchell (1990) for critiques along these lines.
Anthropologists have generally avoided this mistake, although their responsibility for the 5 "savage slot" has produced its share of distortions (Trouillot 1991) . On the effects of the academic division of labor that assigns court centers to historians and commoners, peasants and hill tribes to anthropologists see Atkinson (1989:258) and Errington (1989:29) .
The exception is Java, where the population shifted to the coast a century earlier (Reid 1997) .
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According to David Henley (pers. comm. January 01, 2000) , Dutch visitors to highland areas 7 in Sumatra and Sulawesi often overestimated populations due to a "Shangri La" effect, especially where remote, fertile upland valleys were concerned. In northern Sulawesi, Lauje, Mongondow and Minahasa had substantial highland populations in the precolonial period, but so too did the low-lying Sangir and Talaud islands. In central Sulawesi the population was evenly distributed between upland basins and lowland concentrations like Banggai and the Palu valley.
On Lauje bridewealth payments and the role of imported prestige items such as brass trays 8 and plates see Nourse (1999:251n13) .
Thanks to Albert Schrauwers for accessing and translating Dutch sources. Thanks also to 9 David Henley for data on tobacco exports through Gorontalo 1828-1846. On the historical synergies between corn and tobacco, see Boomgaard (1999) .
This observation seems to contradict the hillside Lauje's own view of their past as violent.
10
Perhaps the coast was rarely attacked, although I did hear of a very violent incident in the 1950s in which the entire family of a coastal trader was killed in their sleep by highlanders, presumably over a breach of trust.
Nourse has traced this history in its several contested versions (1999:46, 55, 63, 177, 236n33) .
11
She concentrated her inquiries in the Siavu river area. I heard different locations for the magical origin site in the adjacent river Siang. The current density of the hillside population (about sixty per square kilometer) and their distribution throughout the interior render unlikely a single origin point or trajectory for "the Lauje" overall. Such claims indicate, rather, attempts to imagine or constitute community in the fractious interior.
Raja Kuti Tombolotutu who ruled from 1927-1963 was considered by many hill folk to have 12 supernatural powers. Nourse's informants readily transferred their loyalty to him when he fulfilled sibling obligations the Olongian neglected, notably by sharing access to Islam, hitherto a coastal secret, and including hillside leaders in rattan extraction ventures (Nourse 1999:31, 60, 64) , a topic I discuss later.
Kinship is cognatic, sometimes with a patrilineal bias (Nourse 1999:82, 88 ) and post-marital 13 residence flexible. Neighborhood clusters form around sibling sets, and ties within and between neighborhoods are consolidated by cousin marriage.
More solid groups of the past may have dispersed when Pax Neerlandica undermined 14 hierarchies associated with violence and protection. If so, it was a perverse outcome of Dutch initiatives intended to bring people within a structure of orderly, hierarchical relations. Dispersal occurred in parts of the interior of Borneo (Boomgaard 1997:13, citing Rousseau 90:120, 137) but Knapen (1997) argues conversely that Dayak dispersed when insecure, while peace enabled a more settled life and greater concentrations of population.
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The Meratus make a similar claim (Tsing 1993) . Wana say their adat was given to them by the 15 Raja of Bungku to prevent people from killing each other and enable disputes to be settled peacefully (Atkinson 1989:267-8) . The names of the Lauje adat offenses match those of Poso, suggesting Lauje may have been included in Dutch efforts to amalgamate Central Sulawesi peoples into a single "Toraja" volk (Schrauwers, pers. comm.) . Whether the Dutch via the Raja introduced adat to the Lauje for the first time or built upon earlier efforts by the Lauje aristocracy is unclear. Boomgaard (1997:14) argues that forest product collection was undertaken only when crops 16 had failed or there was a need to finance a life-cycle ceremony although it became more common and more commercialized after about 1870. Knapen (1997) emphasizes pull factors, arguing that Kalimantan Dayak made continuous assessments of the benefits of trade and contact with coastal powers versus the risks of disease, violence or entrapment. As my Lauje material shows, desire shades into compulsion when cash advances create a cycle of debt in which the ability to re-assess the merits of market involvement is suspended. Henley confirms the existence in pre-colonial northern Sulawesi of a monopolistic advance/ debt system for cotton, gold and forest products (1994; 1996) .
The use of gambling as a labor enticing strategy has been recorded in the Philippines 17 (Aguilar 1994) . Gambling at market places was an important factor in enslavement in nineteenth century Toraja, where "Bugis moneylenders called in their loans without permitting Torajans to redeem their debts with forest products" (Bigalke 1983:350) .
Shallot production replaced tobacco in the 1950s, and former tobacco farmers moved further 18 inland closing the physical gap -but not the social or religious gap -between themselves and the people further inland they call bela. Nourse (1999:64,66) notes that food trade is hierarchical: the party trading higher status foods 19 rice and corn for taro and forest products is superior. I encountered no examples of trade in rice, and corn seems to travel between hillside neighborhoods according to the varied production schedules caused by micro-climates. Taro and cassava are heavy to carry and more quickly consumed by a hungry family, but a supplicant will readily accept these foods if corn is unavailable or too expensive.
Labor may also be mortgaged in return for food, and some people become bonded to their 20 neighbors in this way although the relationship is portrayed as reciprocal assistance.
Coastal coconut trees and the surrounding land have become concentrated in very few 21 hands. When coastal copra and hill products were plentiful, some coastal dwellers worked full time as steevadores at Tinombo's port, and were members of a major trade union. This proletarian moment has since receded, and coastal laboring opportunities are indeed scarce.
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The wild people include some called dampelau (Lauje for naked) supposedly living in hills 22 adjacent to the Lauje area. Some claim to have met dampelau while on rattan collecting expeditions and report with amazement that they speak coastal languages such as Malay and Bugis. This linguistic ability might indicate that these were once coastal people, an interpretation I heard on a few occasions. More likely it stems from the long standing but generally underestimated involvement of hill folk in trade and wage labor. Nourse (1999:39-43) describes Muslim hill folks' fear of the people they call bela, and the claim that bela do not farm, are lazy, dirty, and possibly cannibal. The group she encountered refused to move the coast on Dutch command, and were forced to move about and hide in the forest, impeding food production (Nourse 1999:65-66) . Other Lauje further inland or in adjacent watersheds simply did not hear or respond to the Dutch request, and were deemed timid rather than rebellious.
There might be some at Paladunduan, a tributary of the Siang with a population reputedly 23 so fierce that even the most powerful ward heads and shamans replete with protective magic have never dared to go there. This could also be another wild-folk story.
The resonance of the indigenous peoples' platform in some parts of Indonesia but not 24 others is explored in Li (2000) .
I have explored data troubles in the context of Indonesia's resettlement program in Li 25 (1999a).
Government officials from Palu who hiked with me into the hills had predictably negative 26 reactions to the people, terrain, and farming practices, and declared that government efforts to supervise and bring development should be increased. More interestingly, some were disappointed that the people were so unremarkable and unexotic, without feathers and fancy gear. They purchased their blow-pipes, and their tiny houses were without carvings or other decor. The more intrepid officials nevertheless discovered culture by seeking out old people to tell creation stories, and they found an elderly woman shaman who gave them a special bath to enhance their virility.
On this point see Ferguson (1994) and Li (1999a) . For a rich discussion of the cultural politics 27 of development and related struggles over meanings and resources, see Moore (2000) . In comparison to the Zimbabwe case Moore describes, topography and the relational history of this particular place severely limit the capacity of Lauje hill folk to insist on their own versions of their past and present, and to participate in planning their future.
